



The dispute between development economists and
economic historians on the long-term "terms of
trade" from the middle of the 19th century, from
the 1890's, from 1912, 1931 or 1950-52 has been
revived by the events of the 1973-1974 Corn-
modities Boom. By any standard, prices at the
end of 1973 of key primary commodity exports
had fallen from 1950-52 levels in real terms,
although the fall from 1950-1952 levels had been
only approximately ten to 12 per cent and the
fall from 1953 had been minimal. In 1973 and
1974 prices of petroleum and non-petroleum
primary products rose sharply and the World
Bank terms of trade index briefly exceeded 100
in the period March-June, 1974, (for non-
petroleum primary products). The onset of the
1974-75 global recession has again taken the
index of primary product prices back to 88-90
on a 1950-52 base and the overall "terms of trade"
of important non-petroleum producers and ex-
porters has worsened even more dramatically.
(I calculated in early 1975 that the Indian "terms
of trade" declined from 100 in December, 1973,
to around 65 in December, 1974.)
The basic division of the world into "Gainers"
and "Losers" was made in an article in the
ODI Review, 1(1), 1974 (pp. 24-37) and it was
already clear that South Asia and East and West
Africa (excluding Nigera) were likely to be the
biggest losers over the period 1974-1976.
The losses as a result of the world recession (in
terms of reduced prices for primary product
exports) have been compounded by sharply higher
food prices and massive increases in the price of
crude oil and refined petroleum products. The
sharp price increases between July / September,
1975 and February 1976, in key export products
such as coffee, rubber, cotton, cocoa and tropical
hardwood timber ahead of OECD revival in out-
put may suggest that the 1976-78 recovery may
see another upsurge in the worst of affected pro-
ducts such as copper, oilseeds, sugar etc., but the
damage of 1973-1975 price and volume fluctua-
tions to a number of developing countries is
widely recognised.
Professor Alasdair MacBean in Export Instability
and Economic Growth (London 1967) was exam-
ining the relatively minor fluctuations of the
1950's and 1960's and concluded that the damage
caused by price fluctuations had been exaggerated,
although his findings were disputed by Alfred
Maizels in his review article in the American
Economic Review, December, 1967. However, the
price instability in 1973-75 was the most violent
since the Korean War (1950-52) and the price
fluctuation in copper, tropical hardwoods, cotton
and rubber, combined with the severe impact of
increased oil and fertilizer prices, has crippled the
1975-77 development programmes of a number
of South Asian and African developing countries.
Certain specific price fluctuations in a limited
group of commodities have frustrated and will
continue to frustrate rational economic planning
and foreign exchange budgeting in a limited
number of important developing countries.
Overall, the 1952/1972 period of stagnation, the
1973/1974 boom and the 1974/1975 slump in
commodity prices have reinforced demands from
the developing countries for a system which links
the prices of the bundle of primary products
(raw materials and semi-finished articles) that
they export to their bundle of imports (largely
manufacturing inputs and finished, intermediate
and capital goods).
Alternative systems of indexation
The problem of indexation and export earning
stabilisation schemes (linking primary product
exports to manufactured goods imports) lies essen-
tially in the variety in the trade structure of the
developing world. There are food exporters such
as Argentina, Uruguay, Thailand, Burma and
Parkistan and food importers such as Nigeria,
Ghana, India and the countries of North Africa
and West Asia. Should the basket of commodities
include foodgrains, sugar, edible oils etc.?
Any basket of commodities including foodstuffs
would cause grave embarrassment to the Asian
and African food importers, who are unlikely to
be able to rely on a repetition of the excellent
monsoons, which have produced an excellent
1975 summer harvest throughout Asia. It would
also have the severe disadvantage of giving dis-
proportionate diplomatic power to the temperate
zone food exporters: the United States, Canada,
Australia and also the European Economic Com-
munity (given the subsidised power of the EEC's
common Agricultural Policy). The United States
has spent 1975 examining the possible uses of the
food weapon against the oil weapon and there is
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little doubt that further poor harvests in 1977 and
1978 will see serious attempts to link food prices
to oil prices as part of the overall negotiating
framework.
The price of oil has been suggested as a possible
negotiating base for an international agreement on
indexation, but although the OPEC countries do
include a number of members with a large popu-
lation base (Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran, Algeria and
Iraq), and although a barrel of oil could be
linked to the ex-post price inflator for the United
Nations index of manufactured export prices,
the exercise would do nothing to guarantee the
purchasing power of the non-oil developing
countries, who in the event of 10-15 per cent
global inflation would be forced to pay 10-15
per cent more for petroleum imports and 10-15
per cent more for their imports of manufactured
goods from developed countries.
Any index for food and oil would have to take
into account the important number of developing
countries who now export manufactured goods
but who remain basically in deficit in either oil or
food. In Latin America this includes Brazil,
Argentina and Mexico, in the Mediterranean,
Israel and Yugoslavia, and in Asia, Hong Kong,
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, India and Pakistan.
Only Mexico from this group of manufactured
goods exporters (with $9-10 billion in 1975 value
of processed and manufactured exports) is self-
sufficient in both oil and food. Argentina is
basically in balance, but the small Far East
manufacturing processing countries are totally
dependant on imports for important quantities of
food and oil.
Exporters of food, oil and manufactured goods
represent interests within the developing world
which are likely to be very difficult to reconcile
with the basic Latin American, South Asian and
East and West African group of countries which
are numerically dominant within the Group of
77. These countries are importers of food (in
limited quantities), oil and refined petroleum
products and a wide range of manufactured goods
(largely intermediate and capital goods) and ex-
porters of an important range of beverages (coffee,
cocoa and tea), oilseeds, fibres (cotton, jute and
sisal), metals and mineral ores (copper, tin, bauxite
and iron ore) and industrial raw materials (rubber,
leather, tropical hardwood, phosphates).
The problem of indexation on closer examination
usually turns on the short and medium-term per-
formance of the most important of these products
(by value) such as coffee, copper, cotton, oilseeds
and rubber, or on the dismal long-run relative
price decline of products such as rubber, tea,
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jute, sisal and leather, which have been very
badly affected by changing consumer tastes,
inadequate marketing and promotion and the
impact of technical progress which economises
on use or provides price-competitive synthetics
with superior technical qualities.
The indexation of the major group of items
(coffee, copper etc.) would be exceptionally diffi-
cult to arange even if an "agreed import basket"
of food, petroleum and manufactured goods could
be agreed. Each country would have vastly
different import weights and export weights. Any
fixed ratio would risk technical substitution
(aluminium for copper, tea for coffee and synthetic
fibres for cotton) and heavy over-production by
those countries with low production costs for
raw material exports relative to their basket of
imports. In the case of products facing synthetic
competition, notably rubber, cotton, jute, sisal
and leather etc., indexation will solve no problems.
Their price levels and share of total final demand
in any technical use is determined by price,
availability and technical qualities in competition
with synthetic materials. (Marketing and promo-
tion can make a difference at the margin, but
only at the margin.) These industrial raw materials
are only likely to maintain their export volume
by remaining price-competitive with synthetic
materials and any index-linking to general manu-
factures (measured by UN developed country
export prices) would be irrelevant and disastrous.
Conclusion
A very large number of developing countries are
largely importers of food, oil and manufactured
goods and exporters of beverages, metals and
minerals and industrial raw materials. A number
of their exports have suffered sharp short-term
price falls, or long-term relative price decline
when measured against the price of manufactured
imports. The reasons for these falls are linked
to the 1974/75 global recession in the short term
or the competition of a wide range of synthetic
materials and overproduction in the longer term.
Indexation cannot be a solution for the non-oil
developing countries of Asia, Africa and parts of
Latin America unless oil producers through
OPEC, temperate zone food exporters and a mis-
cellany of developed and developing country
exporters of manufactured goods can agree on a
basket of imports to be used against an export
basket of beverages, metals, minerals and indus-
trial raw materials. The chances of this are remote,
but the gains of an oil! manufactured imports
link (as proposed by Iran and other APEC mem-
bers) or an oil and food/manufactured goods
link would be worthless for countries which are
basically short of food and dependant on oil
imports.
The interests of oil, food and manufactured goods
developing country exporters are too diverse to
be reconciled with the interests of the numerical
bulk of the developing world within an overall
framework of indexation. However, the possibil-
ities of a series of individual commodity pacts
negotiated within the framework of the UNCTAD
integrated programme (following the International
Tin Agreement) is likely to have a better chance
of success provided, firstly that the buffer stocks
are adequately financed and second, that the
buying and selling prices for each commodity are
realistically set in relation to production costs and
medium-term supply and demand conditions in
world markets.
Indexation is far too complicated as a global
solution to commodity problems, but as a measure
to hold the rise of the price of oil to 8-12 per
cent per year it has a certain acceptability to
OPEC exporters and OECD importers, but the
price of arms and military aircraft will be impos-
sible to index and the non-oil developing world
will be forced to pay more for oil and more
for manufactured goods.
Indexation cannot provide price or earning stab-
ility for the largest number of countries in the
developing world. Commodity pacts linked to
buffer stocks will not either insulate their earnings
from a global recession of 1974/75 dimensions
nor protect them from new, low-cost synthetic
substitutes thrown up by technical progress, but
they are likely to be more effective than further
talks about indexation.
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